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Abstract
This paper considers the issue of document type diversity in the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). For many years the
CMP has been collecting and coding a variety of documents, such as speeches, pamphlets, newspaper articles and leaflets, as
manifesto proxies. By using previously unexplored archival material to perform controlled comparisons between different types
of documents, this paper argues that the coding of such documents introduced considerable measurement error to party position
estimates. Statistical analyses indicate that this measurement error is systematic rather than random as it is often manifested as
centrist bias in parties’ left-right position estimates. Consequently, the paper argues that random error correction methods cannot
always correct for error attributed to the coding of proxy documents. The paper concludes with some recommendations for third-
party users of the CMP data and documents and a plea to the CMP research team.
Keywords: Parties, Policy positions, Comparative Manifestos Project, Document selection, Measurement quality
1. Introduction
Political text is an encompassing category which includes the
text generated by individual politicians as well as parties. The
former includes interviews, parliamentary debates and election
campaign speeches whereas the latter consists of documents
that represent the party as a whole. These include press releases
and pamphlets but most importantly the election campaign doc-
uments that are invariably known as programmes, platforms
or manifestos. It is widely considered that manifestos consti-
tute the most objective source of information for parties’ policy
preferences, proposals, positions and, potentially, parties’ ide-
ology. Manifestos are, after all, documents produced by parties
meant to present their positions to the electorate. The fact that
they are often adopted or sanctioned at party congresses, allows
us to produce estimates of the ideology and policy of the party
as a whole and not just of the leadership or a particular faction
(Budge, 2001, 211). Therefore, the policy estimates deriving
from the analysis of party manifestos can be considered as the
most objective source of information (Marks et al., 2007, 27)
as manifestos ‘chart the party’s position at each election on the
basis of its own authoritative policy pronouncement’ (Budge,
2002).
It was exactly these qualities that led researchers to estimate
parties’ policy positions through the content analysis of party
manifestos. The early attempt by Borg (1966) who content an-
alyzed the basic programmes of Finnish parties and Robertson
(1976) who did likewise for British party manifestos, was later
systematized by Ian Budge and his colleagues who established
the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) in 1979. The MRG de-
veloped into an ambitious project of collecting and hand-coding
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party manifestos in 19 countries. Ten years later, the MRG was
renamed to Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) under the
direction of Hans-Dieter Klingemann and was expanded to in-
clude all the OECD countries as well as 24 countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. Most recently, the CMP received a major
12-year grant from the German Research Foundation in order to
expand its document collection and coding to South American
and South Asian countries.1
For the past thirty years, specifically-trained coders have
been parsing the text of party manifestos into ‘quasi-sentences’,
assigning each of these quasi-sentences into one of the CMP’s
56 issue categories (see Volkens, 2002a). The results of this
coding are presented in terms of percentage frequencies, which
intend to measure each party’s ‘relative emphasis’ on each of
these 56 issues. In addition, the CMP uses a scaling technique
to estimate parties’ positions on the left-right (L-R) dimension
(see Laver and Budge, 1992) which Budge and Klingemann
(2001, 19) called the project’s ‘crowning achievement’. The
rich time-series data produced by the CMP have been made
freely available to researchers, as part of the Mapping Pol-
icy Preferences books (Budge et al., 2001, Klingemann et al.,
2006), and as a consequence, the CMP has been established as
the prima facie data source for parties’ positions on the L-R
dimension as well as on many other policy dimensions.2 More-
over, the CMP data have often been employed as a ‘golden stan-
1In 2009 the CMP was renamed to Manifesto Research on Political Repre-
sentation (MARPOR) but since the project is mostly known by its previous title,
this paper will use the CMP acronym throughout. For a history of the project
see Budge (2002) and Volkens (2002b). The project’s website can be accessed
at: http://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/
2This is evident from the use of data in more than 100 research mono-
graphs, peer-reviewed publications and PhD theses (>1,000 citations in Google
Scholar) and the 2003 Best Data Set Award by the American Political Science
Association.
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dard’ to validate the results of computerized coding of party
manifestos (see Bara, 2001, Budge and Pennings, 2007a, Laver
and Garry, 2000), while the CMP approach to coding has been
followed by projects such as the Euromanifestos Project and the
Regional Manifestos Project.
Notwithstanding the success of the CMP, the acceptance of
its data has not been universal. In section 2, I consider a pre-
viously unexplored source of measurement error in the CMP:
the diversity in the type of coded documents. I argue that the
coding of documents other than manifestos introduces an ad-
ditional source of measurement error in the L-R estimates and
that this error is systematic rather than random in nature. In
the sections that follow the identification of this problem, I of-
fer evidence about the nature and the extent of the problem by
using three analytical approaches. In section 3, I conduct a con-
trolled comparison between manifestos and speeches, in section
4, I compare documents qualitatively by looking at the codes
assigned to quasi-sentences, and in section 5, I compare statis-
tically the L-R estimates from manifestos to those from other
types of documents against a common benchmark. The anal-
yses reveal the presence of systematic error in the CMP L-R
estimates which can be partially attributed to the type of coded
documents. The concluding section offers some suggestions to
the CMP research team and third-party users of the CMP docu-
ments and data.
2. The problem of proxy documents in the CMP
As McDonald (2006, 90) put it, ‘few party scholars doubt
that noise comes into the CMP scores’ from a variety of sources.
Since noise implies random rather than systematic measure-
ment error, most of the critical literature in the context of the
CMP has focussed on the former. For instance, researchers
have considered the stochastic process of document generation
(Benoit et al., 2009b), the parsing of text into quasi-sentence
(Da¨ubler et al., forthcoming), the coding of quasi-sentences into
issue categories (Mikhaylov et al., 2012) and the scaling of fre-
quency categories into the L-R (Lowe et al., 2011) as sources of
random measurement error in the CMP estimates. To the con-
trary, research so far has not considered the diversity of type in
the coded documents as a source of measurement error. In fact,
most third-party users of the CMP data are not aware that a con-
siderable portion of the CMP datasets are based on the coding
of documents other than manifestos.
In a rather illustrative article about Danish parties, Hansen
(2008, 207–210) observed that the CMP has coded, among oth-
ers, an advertisement/insert from a partisan newspapers bun-
dled with a more general manifesto, an issue of a party maga-
zine which included a telegram from Ronald Reagan, bundles
of speeches by the party leader, a document composed by a ri-
val party think tank, a manifesto from the previous year’s local
election, draft manifestos, advertisements in local newspapers
and so on. Hansen (2008) convincingly argued that the Dan-
ish documents analyzed by the CMP are very different in terms
of breadth and scope and that many of these documents can-
not be considered as being equivalent to manifestos. Similarly,
Proksch and Slapin (2009, 329–330) found that the German
party documents collected by the CMP included party congress
speeches, many of the so-called Wahlaufruf or short election
proclamations and, in one case, an action programme published
two years after the election for which it was used for. Again,
the authors argued that these documents cannot be considered
to be equivalent and comparable to election manifestos since
they differ in terms of size, style and authoritativeness.
Denmark and Germany are not the only countries that show
considerable diversity in the type of coded documents. For in-
stance, in Belgium we find regional manifestos (e.g. Parti So-
cial Chre´tien 1977), in Finland election flyers (e.g. Kansallinen
Kokoomus 1979), in France party leader speeches (e.g. Parti
Communiste Franc¸ais 1988), in Ireland journalists’ reports at
the national press (e.g. Fianna Fail Nov. 1982), in Italy pro-
gramme summaries published in the partisan press (e.g. Movi-
mento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale 1992), in Romania
hand-written documents (e.g. Convent¸ia Democrata˘ Romaˆna˘
1992) and in Switzerland summaries of election manifestos
(e.g. Sozialdemokratische Partei der Scheiz 1995). Moreover,
for Japan the CMP coding was based exclusively on ‘rapid-fire
preelection interviews by a national daily newspaper’ which are
extremely short and constrained in the range of issues (Proksch
et al., 2010, 115), whereas for Israel the CMP collection is al-
most entirely based on articles, advertisements and interviews
in national newspapers.
There is ample evidence that the CMP investigators who col-
lected and coded these documents have expressed their scep-
ticism regarding whether all these documents can be used as
proxies to the strictly defined manifestos.3 This is because the
inclusion of material such as reports in newspapers, speeches,
pamphlets and leaflets was borne out of necessity, rather than a
well-thought strategy based on evidence showing that the dif-
ferent types of documents can be considered to be equivalent
to manifestos for the purpose of estimating parties’ policy po-
sitions.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine the degree of doc-
ument type diversity by looking at the CMP datasets and ap-
pendices with document titles. Both datasets contain a variable
(progtype) which indicates the type of coded document by dif-
ferentiating among ‘manifestos’ (progtype=1), ‘estimates’, that
is linear interpolations or copy/pasted data from one year to an-
other (progtype=3); ‘joint programmes’ that is, electoral coali-
tion manifestos which are used for one or more parties after
being weighted according to party strength (progtype=2,4,5,7);
‘general programmes’ which are not tied to a particular election
(progtype=6) and ‘other’ (progtype=8). The CMP claims that
86.71% of the estimates in the datasets are based on the coding
of manifestos but an independent classification of documents in
four countries revealed considerable differences.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 presents some of the evi-
dence based on an alternative classification of documents based
3Those interested can find such evidence in the contributions in Budge et al.
(1987) as well as in the early correspondence between Ian Budge and his collab-
orators. The correspondence can be found in an extensive collection of materi-
als relating to the development of the MRG/CMP which were deposited by Ian
Budge at GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne and have
since been moved to Social Science Centre, Berlin.
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Figure 1: Some differences between the CMP classification and an independent classification of coded documents (% figures).
on the inspection of the actual documents and consultations
with country experts who have conducted extensive manifesto
research in national and party archives. The alternative clas-
sification aimed to separate party manifestos, from joint plat-
forms and ‘other’ types of documents (speeches, flyers, etc).
Whenever there was uncertainty as to what the document was,
the CMP classification was retained. I believe that few re-
searchers would question this alternative classification given
that the CMP tendency to label almost every document in the
dataset as a manifesto. Most of the documents I classified as
‘other’ are clearly speeches, interviews or flyers and/or I found
compelling (sometimes archival or interview) evidence that the
party in question did not intend the particular document to serve
as their manifesto for the election in question.4 The findings in
Figure 1 confirm the observations made for Denmark and Ger-
many arguing that the CMP is underestimating the degree of
diversity in its coded documents. To be fair, the countries men-
tioned so far (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Romania and Switzerland)
show a considerable variation in the coded documents. Con-
versely, the collection for the British parties consists entirely of
manifestos and for a few other countries, such as the Nether-
lands, the CMP has coded very few documents which are not
manifestos. In such countries, however, document quality was
ensured because the manifestos came from well-known pub-
lished collections.
Unlike previous research in the sources of error in the CMP
estimates, this paper considers the coding of proxy documents
4The details for the alternative coding can be found in the codebook which
will be made available online together with the replication material for the anal-
yses conducted in the following sections.
as a source of systematic error. Given that systematic error
‘does not yield easily to analysis and estimation’ (Zeller and
Carmines, 1980, 136) because, most often than not, we are ag-
nostic of the true score variance, the following sections adopt
three different approaches in identifying document type diver-
sity as a source of measurement error and the extent to which
this error can be considered to be systematic rather than ran-
dom.
3. Controlled comparisons of documents
Estimating measurement error coming solely from variation
in the type of coded documents requires keeping error com-
ing from other sources constant. Unfortunately, such controlled
comparisons are quite hard to achieve without the use of suit-
able document material. The inspection of the documents col-
lected by the CMP, however, offers such a unique opportunity.
It seems that the Greek CMP coder collected and coded a num-
ber of party leader speeches for the social democratic PASOK
(Panhellenic Socialist Movement) in addition to its manifestos.
Whether this was done purely for the sake of convenience (since
speeches are much shorter compared to the notoriously long
PASOK manifestos) or because the coder was unaware that the
party published manifestos for every election (see Clogg, 1987,
Kalogeropoulou, 1989, Spourdalakis, 1988) is difficult to tell.
Nevertheless, the copies of the speeches with issue categories
assigned to quasi-sentences can be found in the archives of the
Social Science Centre, Berlin.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics from the com-
parison of PASOK manifestos to the speeches delivered by the
party leader during the election campaigns. It is clear from the
3
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figures, that the two types of documents differ considerably in
terms of size or policy coverage. As theorized by Laver and
Benoit (2002, 65), manifestos are much larger than party leader
speeches (quasi-sentences column) and cover a much broader
range of issues (issues column). Moreover, as is evident from
the high frequency of uncoded quasi-sentences, speeches fea-
ture a different ‘language register’ (Laver and Benoit, 2002,
65) which was not captured effectively by the CMP coding
scheme. Speeches are clearly far from being ‘authoritative
statements’ that can be used as ‘manifesto surrogates’. The in-
teresting counterfactual question, however, is whether the use
of speeches instead of manifestos could have produced a differ-
ent, and perhaps implausible, view of PASOK’s L-R position.
Table 1: Comparing manifestos to party leader speeches: PASOK 1977–
1989.
Document Pages Quasi- Percent Issuessentences uncoded
Manifesto 1977 151 2704 0.3 47
Speech 1977 20 417 6.95 36
Manifesto 1981 125 2991 0.67 48
Speech 1981 10 346 10.98 37
Manifesto 1985 96 3244 0.46 48
Speech 1985 13 428 19.16 34
Manifesto June 1989 80 2215 0.36 47
Speech June 1989 12 198 22.22 26
Manifesto November 1989 80 2215 0.36 47
Speech November 1989 32 417 13.67 36
Source: For manifestos and November 1989 speech, CD-ROM in Budge et
al. (2001); for other speeches, own calculations based on the coded docu-
ments found in the CMP archive.
The answer to this question can be found in Figure 2 which
shows the L-R trajectory of PASOK from November 1974 to
the November 1989 election by using the ‘standard’ CMP scal-
ing technique. The dashed line connects the L-R positions as
estimated by using party leader speeches and the solid line the
L-R positions as estimated by using election manifestos.5 Since
the handwriting in the coding of manifestos and speeches is
identical, we can be confident that the coding was performed
by the same person. In this sense, the comparison controls for
measurement error stemming from inter-coder unreliability (see
Mikhaylov et al., 2012). Moreover, by using the bootstrapped
confidence intervals proposed by Benoit et al. (2009b), the com-
parison controls for differences reflecting the stochastic process
of document generation.6
Figure 2 shows that, by content analyzing different types of
documents, we get results which, in most of the cases, differ
considerably even when the confidence intervals are taken into
account. The PASOK ideological trajectory as given by the
coding of manifestos appears to be quite stable, with swings
5For 1974 there is a single point because an interview with the party sec-
retary indicated that the particular speech was meant to be used as the party
manifesto. In addition, primary sources indicate that PASOK did not issue
a manifesto for the November 1989 election but ran the campaign on the June
1989 manifesto hence the identical figures for November 1989 (Gemenis, 2010,
168, 182).
6I used an R script file kindly provided by Slava Mikhaylov to calculate the
confidence intervals for the new documents.
between 1974–1977 and 1985–1989. These swings can be eas-
ily explained. Is is well documented in the literature that PA-
SOK almost doubled its share of vote (from 13.58 to 25.34%)
between 1974 and 1977 by moderating its extreme leftist dis-
course (see Spourdalakis, 1988). Moreover, the party became
even more moderate after 1985 when it was forced to reconsider
its socialist economic policies and introduced a neo-liberal ‘sta-
bilization programme’ (see Tsakalotos, 1998). The party image
we get from the coded speeches is quite different. PASOK ap-
pears to have moved towards the centre after 1977, whereas for
the duration of the 1980s, the speech-based estimates place PA-
SOK consistently, and by almost 20 points on the L-R scale,
closer to the centre compared to manifesto-based estimates. To
be sure, it can be argued that PASOK was not as radical in the
1980s as its manifestos portray it. However, the speeches place
PASOK closer to the centre not because the speeches are cen-
trist in terms of policy emphasis, but they do so because of the
high percentage of quasi-sentences that remained uncoded.
Jan75
Jan80
Jan85
Jan90
−40 −30 −20 −10 0 10
Left−right position
Figure 2: The left-right trajectory of PASOK (1974–1989) with bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals, through manifestos (solid lines) and party leader
speeches (dashed lines).
To understand why uncoded quasi-sentences move the party
to the centre we should consider the way the ‘standard’ CMP
L-R scale is constructed. In a review essay, Laver (2001) was
one of the first to point out several serious shortcomings of the
‘standard’ CMP L-R scaling technique. According to this tech-
nique, the sum of the emphasis on a fixed set of ‘right’ issues is
subtracted from another fixed set of ‘left’ issues and divided by
the total number of quasi-sentences ( R−LN ). Laver (2001) cau-
tioned third-party users of the CMP data to be aware of the
statistical properties of the scale. According to the ‘standard’
scale, party movement on the L-R scale is not only caused by
changes in emphasis on the coding categories included in the
Left and Right components but also by changes in the empha-
sis to all the other categories excluded from the scale (Laver,
2001, 22), including the category of ‘uncoded’ quasi-sentences.
In other words, the discourse that cannot be captured by the
CMP coding scheme moves parties to the centre. Because be-
tween one fifth and one quarter of the PASOK speech content
was deemed uncodable, the coding of speeches gives the false
4
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impression of movement towards the centre. The fact that the
manifesto and speech estimates move almost parallel to each
other provides strong evidence that the measurement error in-
troduced by coding speeches in place of manifestos is system-
atic rather than random. Researchers have thus far attempted to
deal with the problem of uncoded content by using alternative
scaling methods (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006, Kim and Ford-
ing, 1998, Lowe et al., 2011). The problem of coding proxy
documents, however, is more complex and cannot be effectively
solved by scaling alone. The following section considers how
the differences in political discourse, as presented in speeches
and manifestos, and the specificities of selecting pamphlets as
manifesto proxies also introduce systematic error with a centrist
direction.
4. Qualitative comparisons of documents
The CMP coding scheme has been devised with British party
manifestos (and to a lesser extent American party platforms)
in mind. As such, it is very well suited to capture the ‘list-of-
pledges’ style of British manifestos, but rather unsuitable for
(party leader) speeches which include more complex argumen-
tation, rhetorical devices, emotional appeals (see Beard, 2000,
Brader, 2006) or otherwise non-pledge content. The 1996 CMP
estimates for the conservative New Democracy (ND), the Com-
munist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Coalition of the Left
and Progress (SYN) are illustrative cases in point. For both
SYN and KKE the CMP coded party leader speeches, even
though both parties published more detailed ‘list-of-pledges’
style electoral manifestos.7 For ND, the CMP coded a collec-
tion of seven policy pamphlets which were published at vari-
ous dates before the election. The result of the coding was an
extreme right position for the ‘greenish’ radical left SYN and
a centrist position for the orthodox Stalinist KKE and conser-
vative ND. Both Benoit and Laver (2007, 99) and Dinas and
Gemenis (2010) recognized that, on the basis of expert surveys
and knowledge of Greek politics, these estimates do not make
sense. A closer analysis, however, indicates that these implau-
sible positions reflect systematic error introduced by the choice
made by the CMP to code the aforementioned documents in
place of the manifestos.
The speech by the SYN leader, Nikos Konstantopoulos used
extensively the 1996 election slogan ‘we are not afraid to look
into your eyes’ (i.e. we are honest). As SYN failed to pass the
newly instituted 3% threshold for parliamentary representation
in 1993, the party’s advertisers thought of using this slogan as
an emotional appeal. In addition, Konstantopoulos made exten-
sive references to the disproportionality of the electoral system.
The CMP however, coded most of the numerous emotional ap-
peals as ‘305: Political Authority: Positive’ and the references
to the electoral system as ‘606: social harmony’, both of which
are right-wing issues in the standard L-R scale. Consequently,
7This is evident by the press conferences held by KKE and SYN to launch
the manifestos (eklogiki diakeryxe) as reported in the press (see Rizospastis 27
August 1996 and Eleftherotypia 28 August 1996 respectively).
according to the CMP, the widely acknowledged as radical left
SYN, is placed on the extreme right of the political spectrum
because its leader said that his party is honest and that it op-
poses the majoritarian electoral system. Had the CMP coded
the SYN election manifesto instead, we would have been pre-
sented with a more valid position of SYN in the policy space.
This is because the manifesto featured a different language, less
focussed on slogans and emotional appeals, and more focussed
on presenting the positions of the party in six policy areas (for-
eign policy, economic and social policy, development, social
justice, environmental protection and political institutions).
The situation with KKE is fairly similar. The speech by
the KKE secretary general Aleka Papariga featured many state-
ments attacking the non proportional electoral system and the
two-party system, which were were coded as ‘606’ and ‘305’
(right-wing issue categories). Consider the following statement
which the CMP considers to consist of eight right-wing quasi-
sentences:
‘Shall we accept fatefully that this country is gov-
erned, sometimes by a PASOK majority and some-
times by a ND majority, with the help of an unjust
electoral law? [. . . ] It is not appropriate for our ide-
ology and for our politics to sit by and wait for the
big changes to come suddenly on a day or overnight.’
[my translation]
It is rather evident that there is nothing right-wing in the
statement above so the problem with the 1996 KKE estimate
(which appears to be far more right-wing than expected from
an orthodox Stalinist party) is due to the coding of a speeches
which does not tell us much about KKE’s policy positions. Just
like the speech by Konstantopoulos, the speech by Papariga was
a mix of emotional appeals, slogans, attacks to the other parties
and the electoral system, and only occasionally presented the
policies of the party. Conversely, the election manifesto, which
was prepared by the party central committee, presented a far
more valid (if in a very populist language) picture of KKE’s
policy positions.
The situation is different regarding ND since the party does
not appear to have issued a manifesto for the 1996 election.
This is hardly surprising, however, because ND rarely issued
election manifestos before 2000. Instead, the party showed a
preference for long-term programmes which were published af-
ter party congresses in order to signal major changes in ideol-
ogy (think of the Bad Godesberg programme) or, since the late
1980s, policy pamphlets on specific issues (Alexakis, 1993).
Much like the Scandinavian and German ‘basic programmes’,
policy pamphlets are not usually linked to specific elections but
feature a detailed treatment of a particular issue. Apart from the
apparent differences in their role and the way they are drafted
when compared to electoral manifestos, the use of policy pam-
phlets as manifesto proxies poses a selection problem: which
combination of pamphlets can approximate the election mani-
festo? Consider a party which, for whatever reasons, commis-
sioned the writing of five green/white papers on five different
issues. In the lack of an election manifesto, should we assume
5
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that it would be only these five issues that make up of party’s
ideology? Should we assume that these five documents taken
together will give a valid placement of the party on the L-R
dimension?
To estimate the 1996 ND position, the CMP coded together
seven such pamphlets on the subjects of economy, public ad-
ministration, the environment, education, sports, and culture. I
argue that it is a brave assumption to consider these seven pam-
phlets as a proxy for the 1996 ND election manifesto. First, the
pamphlets are simple typescript documents that look nothing
like the pamphlets meant for public release. More than any-
thing, they look like internal working papers. Second, there
is no evidence that ND wanted to emphasize education, sports
and culture as much as the economy for the 1996 election. In
fact, apart from the economy, it was foreign policy, defence, law
and order and farmers’ issues which featured predominantly in
the 1996 ND election campaign (see Featherstone and Kaza-
mias, 1997, Papathanassopoulos, 2000). As a consequence, the
coding of the pamphlets on the environment, sports and cul-
ture, which consist primarily of issues that do not feature on the
CMP L-R scale, effectively but spuriously moved ND towards
the centre and close to the, equally spurious centrist, position of
KKE.
KKE*
SYN*
PASOK
DIKKI
ND*
POLAN
−20 −10 0 10 20
Left−right position (’rile’)
KKE*
SYN*
PASOK
DIKKI
ND*
POLAN
−1 0 1 2 3
Left−right position (’logrile’)
Figure 3: The 1996 election positioning of Greek parties according to the ‘rile’
and ‘logrile’ Left-right scales (with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals).
The asterisks indicate estimates based on proxy documents.
To demonstrate the problems in positioning parties based on
proxy documents, Figure 3 compares the standard CMP L-R
placement (‘rile’) to the Lowe et al. (2011) logged version of
the same scale (‘logrile’) for the 1996 election in Greece. In
both scales, the L-R estimates come with bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals which account for the uncertainty associ-
ated with the stochastic process of document generation (Benoit
et al., 2009b). As most of the standard estimates in Figure 3
have already been dismissed as implausible according to the
literature (Dinas and Gemenis, 2010) and the discussion above,
we can focus on whether the logged version of the scale and the
confidence intervals present any improvements in terms of face
validity.8 We see that three out of six placements remain rela-
tively stable between the two scales (ND, PASOK and its leftist
splinter party DIKKI). The ‘logrile’ manages to move the rad-
ical left SYN from the extreme right to the left but only at the
expense of moving the communist KKE which to the extreme
right and the conservative splinter POLAN to the left.
Even though the ‘logrile’ scale does not take into account un-
coded quasi-sentences which spuriously move parties towards
the centre of the scale, the scale does not take into account the
problem of misclassification (Mikhaylov et al., 2012). Misclas-
sification does not only result to random measurement error but
also leads to the problem of regression towards the mean (Nes-
selroade et al., 1980, 624–625) where extremist parties are more
likely to move away from the extremes of the scale than centrist
parties to move away from the centre of the scale. This has been
shown empirically by Mikhaylov et al. (2012, 89) who con-
cluded that misclassification is ‘causing a centrist bias in the
estimated Rile values even when the misclassification matrix
is strictly symmetric’. The source of misclassification-induced
bias seems to be the reduction in the number of issue categories
found in the coded documents (Mikhaylov et al., 2012, 89). As
proxy documents have been shown to contain fewer issue cate-
gories than the respective party manifestos (Table 1), we see
why proxy documents lead to systematic measurement error
which cannot be corrected by scaling procedures such as the
one proposed by Lowe et al. (2011). In the next section I offer
a more systematic analysis regarding the question of random
versus systematic error in the context of document diversity.
5. Statistical comparisons of documents
So far the paper has demonstrated that the error introduced by
proxy documents tends to move L-R estimates towards the cen-
tre. Since the previous two sections used evidence from a small
number of parties in Greece, it would be useful to see whereas
we can detect systematic error in the L-R estimates when com-
paring parties from various countries and whereas this error can
be attributed to document diversity. Detecting systematic error
from document diversity is akin to detecting error from method
artefacts. In this sense, I follow the reasoning of Zeller and
8To be sure, one could challenge the view that the CMP estimates have a
low face validity on the basis that the late 1980s and early 1990s was a curious
period for party placements in Greece because of the 1989 ND and KKE/SYN
government coalition. As Pridham and Verney (1991) and Verney (1990) have
amply demonstrated, however, the short-lived (June to November) 1989 coali-
tion was essentially a caretaker government which aimed to facilitate the legal
proceedings against the former prime minister and several PASOK ministers
who were implicated in a major corruption scandal. There is no evidence that
the coalition was based on a programmatic convergence between the parties
nor there is evidence that it influenced party positions into the 1990s. For in-
stance, in the 1996 election study conducted by the Centre for Social Research
in Greece (EKKE), mean party placement (with 95% CIs) on the 1–10 L-R
scale was as follows: KKE: 1.88 [1.79, 1.96], SYN: 2.78 [2.69, 2.87], DIKKI:
4.55 [4.46, 4.64], PASOK: 4.87 [4.77, 4.96], POLAN: 7.02 [6.90, 7.14], ND:
8.40 [8.30, 8.51].
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Carmines (1980, 107) who advised researchers to compare two
sets of observations one which is assumed to be affected by the
method artefact and another which is known that is unaffected.
I therefore choose to compare the CMP L-R estimates to esti-
mates coming from expert surveys because it is highly unlikely
that expert estimates are influenced by the type of document
coded by the CMP. The comparison includes parties in France,
Greece, Ireland and Switzerland for which I could match L-R
scores between the CMP datasets and the available expert sur-
veys (for details on matching, see the Appendix). The choice
of countries was dictated by the need to use the data from the
independent classification of documents provided in Figure 1.9
Although the countries used in the statistical analysis represent
only a small portion of the CMP datasets, the practice is in line
with other approaches which have made similar comparisons
using a subset of countries (Klingemann et al., 2006, 77–79) or
elections (Benoit and Laver, 2007, 95–100).
Comparing CMP and expert estimates presents us with two
problems however. The first is treating expert estimates as the
‘gold standard’. Even though expert estimates are assumed to
have high face validity (Benoit and Laver, 2007, Marks et al.,
2007, Steenbergen and Marks, 2007) because we should not ex-
pect experts to give estimates which do not make sense (Dinas
and Gemenis, 2010, 435), they are far from being a ‘gold stan-
dard’ (Budge, 2000, Curini, 2010). The second problem is the
use of correlation coefficients to assess error when comparing
two methods of measurement. As has been pointed out (Krip-
pendorff, 1970, 144), agreement between two methods (Y = X)
is not the same as linearity (Y = bX). Agreement implies that
points are close to the 45◦ line which indicates perfect con-
cordance, while correlation coefficients such as Pearson’s r are
high when points are close to any straight line (Bland and Alt-
man, 1986, 307). In other words, Pearson’s r is unable to detect
the presence of systematic measurement error because it reflects
dispersion rather than precision.
To overcome these problems, I transpose the estimates to a
common metric and plot the difference between the CMP and
expert L-R estimates versus their mean in what is commonly
known (at least in medical statistics) as the Bland-Altman plot.
The rationale behind the plot is similar to the rationale behind
regression residual plots. The difference between the two mea-
sures removes much of the substantive variation leaving the
measurement error while, in lack of a true measurement or
‘golden standard’, the mean of the two measures serves as the
best estimate available (Bland and Altman, 1986, 308). More-
over, the difference is plotted against the mean rather than each
of the measures because the latter approach introduces a statis-
tical artefact since the difference is related to each of the mea-
sures (Bland and Altman, 1995).
As seen in Figure 4, the dotted line of mean agreement be-
tween the CMP and expert estimates (.003) is very close to the
9The figure presents a classification among manifestos, joint platforms, ‘es-
timates’ (interpolated and extrapolated data) and ‘other’. For the statistical
comparison I further distinguished speeches from ‘other’ documents whereas
I classified the ‘estimates’ to the remaining categories depending on the type of
documents in which the interpolation/extrapolation was based on. The details
for both classifications are available in the codebook and replication material.
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Figure 4: Bland-Altman plot of agreement between expert and CMP L-R esti-
mates.
line of perfect agreement at 0. This does not imply a near per-
fect agreement between the two methods however. To the con-
trary, the dispersion of points from the y = 0 line indicates
disagreement. Moreover, the apparent trend in the plot and the
.76 correlation between the difference and the mean imply the
presence of systematic measurement error. If there was no bias,
the points would be scattered randomly between the limits of
agreement and no trend would be discernible. This is not the
case in this plot, however. The two methods agree most when
parties are close to the centre of the L-R scale and disagree most
when parties are placed towards the extremes of the scale. This
result is consistent with the findings in sections 3 and 4 of the
paper which showed that some of the CMP estimates exhibit a
centrist bias.10 In addition, when the ‘rile’ L-R is replaced with
the logged version of ‘rile’ proposed by Lowe et al. (2011), one
can still observe a trend indicating bias (correlation between
the difference and the mean .52). This is a rather telling finding
which leads to the following question. Can some of this bias be
attributed to the coding of proxy documents? In other words,
does the coding of speeches and other types of documents in-
stead of manifestos make parties appear as centrist when ex-
perts argue that the same parties should be placed towards the
extremes?
An answer to this question can be given by computing the
concordance correlation coefficient (Lin, 1989) which has been
devised to assess agreement between two methods of measure-
ment. Unlike Pearson’s r, the concordance correlation coeffi-
cient ρˆc combines measures of precision and accuracy to de-
termine the average point deviation from the 45◦ line of per-
fect concordance. Moreover, unlike intraclass correlation co-
efficients, ρˆc can separate random from systematic error (Lin,
1989, 264). This is because, in essence, ρˆc is a multiplica-
tive term between Pearson’s r which measures dispersion and
the bias correction factor Cb, which measures the deviation of
10When the 95% limits of agreement are adjusted for the observed trend in
the data, by calculating them after regressing the difference to the mean −0.36+
0.73 Expert+CMP2 ± 2.46(0.03 + 0.06 Expert+CMP2 ), most of the observations that
fall outside the limits are estimates based in non-manifesto documents.
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the fit line from the 45◦ line of perfect concordance. In prac-
tical terms, a low r indicates the presence of random measure-
ment error and a low Cb indicates the presence of systematic
measurement error. The results for the full sample and for the
estimates based in the coding of manifestos, joint platforms,
speeches and other documents are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Assessing method agreement, random and systematic
error for different types of coded documents.
n ρˆc SE(ρˆc) r Cb
Manifestos 80 .666 .039 .824 .808
Joint platforms 4 .086 .083 .912 .094
Speeches 13 .561 .119 .849 .660
Other documents 10 .280 .317 .402 .929
All documents 107 .628 .038 .779 .807
Note: The figures compare experts’ L-R estimates to CMP’s
‘rile’ scale. The statistics are, concordance correlation coeffi-
cient ρˆc, product-moment correlation coefficient r, and bias cor-
rection factor Cb.
Since the results for joint platforms and other documents
are only informative due to the small number of observations
which result to large standard errors, two things are made clear
from looking at the table. First, that the overall agreement be-
tween the CMP and expert estimates denoted by ρˆc (.628) is
poor (according to Lin, 1989, 263), but slightly better in the
set which includes only estimates based in the coding of man-
ifestos (.666). Second, coding speeches instead of manifestos
contributes to disagreement by means of systematic measure-
ment error (denoted by the decrease in Cb) rather by means of
random measurement error (denoted by the slight increase in
r). These findings indicate that at least some of the system-
atic error evident in the CMP L-R estimates (as shown in the
Bland-Altman plot) can be attributed to the coding of proxy
documents.
6. Conclusions
This paper argued that the speeches, pamphlets and other
documents which were coded by the CMP in place of mani-
festos cannot be considered as equivalent to manifestos. They
are drafted through different processes and thus might not rep-
resent the party as a whole; they have different roles in the
election campaigns and thus may not cover all policy issues;
and they feature different ‘language registers’ which cannot al-
ways be captured effectively and reliably by the CMP coding
scheme. This paper showed that the selection and coding of
such documents can introduce measurement error in addition to
the error introduced into the CMP by other means (McDonald,
2006, 90). Most specifically this error seems to be introduc-
ing a centrist bias to the L-R estimates and lead to implausible
party placements especially for parties that are generally con-
sidered to be closer to the extremes of the L-R scale. More-
over, the paper argued that bootstrapped confidence intervals
(Benoit et al., 2009b) and alternative scaling methods (Lowe
et al., 2011) which have been devised with random measure-
ment error in mind, cannot always account for such bias. These
findings have several implications for the third-party users of
the CMP data and documents.
Regarding third-party users of the CMP data, the coding of
proxy documents implies that, for many parties, the CMP L-
R estimates as well as the emphases on individual policy areas
might be invalid due to the presence of systematic measure-
ment error. I concur with Benoit et al. (2009b) and Lowe et al.
(2011) that researchers should use the proposed confidence in-
tervals and logit scales, but I add that researchers should also
acknowledge that these techniques are only partial solutions
to a more fundamental problem. Researchers should double
check whether their results are driven by influential observa-
tions based on the so called ‘estimates’ or other non-manifesto
data, and check whether outliers can be explained by problems
of data quality.
Regarding third-party users of the CMP documents, the prob-
lem identified in this paper implies that a considerable portion
of the CMP collection cannot be used for computerized analy-
ses (cf. Pennings, 2006) or alternative coding schemes unless,
of course, the collection is used for comparisons across the
same type of documents (e.g. Proksch et al., 2010). I therefore
concur with Proksch and Slapin (2009, 338) that ‘computer-
based position estimation cannot replace the researcher’s judge-
ment [and] that researchers first need to assure the quality of
the source documents’. To this end, Benoit et al. (2009a) have
set up an on-line database of documents that can be used by
those interested in computerized analyses of manifestos. The
database builds heavily on the CMP collection but can be easily
updated and includes a feedback mechanism with which users
can identify problematic documents and offer suggestions for
improvements.
Regarding the CMP as a project, I concur with Hansen (2008,
215) that the CMP team could dedicate some of its resources to
trace and code the manifestos which are missing from its col-
lection, replaced by proxy documents, or replaced by interpo-
lated/extrapolated data (the so called ‘estimates’). This is prob-
ably easier than we might think. Thirty years ago when the bulk
of the CMP documents was collected, researchers had prob-
lems locating most manifestos and relied instead on proxy doc-
uments. Today, with infrastructure such as the internet and so-
cial science data archives, the missing manifestos can be found
quite easily. For example, the Finnish Social Science Data
Archive (FSD) has collected 846 party programmes of various
kinds for 58 Finnish political parties. This is an untapped col-
lection which the CMP could use to replace some rather prob-
lematic documents in its collection. Moreover, in many coun-
tries, parties have well maintained archives which often include
full collections of party manifestos, while in many instances re-
searchers have accumulated such collections themselves during
the writing of their PhD theses (e.g. Gibbons, 2003). To this
end I have communicated to the CMP team a number of ways
which document collection can be improved and provided the
team with a number of manifestos which were previously miss-
ing or replaced by a proxy document (usually a party leader
speech).
Despite earlier suggestions to accept the CMP data ‘as is’
(Budge and Pennings, 2007b, Volkens et al., 2009), the current
team is committed to addressing the problems of measurement
error that have been outlined in the literature. On the one hand,
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the CMP is considering changing its policy of leaving document
selection at the coders’ discretion and intensifying the various
quality checks (Volkens, 2001). On the other hand, however,
the CMP remains skeptical as to whether the project should re-
place any non-manifesto observations in the existing collection
by coding alternative documents (such as the ones that have
been recently sent to the CMP). The argument against revisit-
ing the original CMP collection and dataset is that the new doc-
uments will have to be coded by different coders and this could
introduce a different source of measurement error, namely er-
ror stemming from inter-coder unreliability (Mikhaylov et al.,
2012). I agree that revising the CMP document collection will
not solve each and every problem, but by doing so we could at
least have a valid basis of documents on which we can imple-
ment different coding and scaling methods. This would only
enrich the unparalleled collection of the CMP that has con-
tributed to the advancement of our knowledge on democratic
representation, coalition formation, programmatic change and
party competition.
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Appendix: Matching expert L-R estimates to CMP’s ‘rile’
scale
To match the CMP L-R estimates to expert estimates I used
estimates from the expert surveys presented in Table 3. In par-
ticular, I followed the following steps: a) For each of the four
countries included in the analysis (France, Greece, Ireland and
Switzerland) I used scores for the periods available in the ex-
pert surveys indicated in Table 3. This means that I matched
the CMP estimates to expert surveys between 1989 and 2003
for Greek and Swiss parties, between 1982 and 2003 for Irish
parties and between 1981 and 2002 for French parties. b) Es-
timates were matched based on the year of the expert survey
fieldwork rather than the year of publication. c) As expert sur-
veys were not always conducted during election years, I inter-
polated between different surveys to acquire estimates for the
election years in between. For example, for the 1989 elections
in Greece I use the 1989 survey conducted by Laver and Hunt
(1992), but because we have no expert survey for 1993, I ob-
tained estimates by interpolating between the 1989 Laver and
Hunt (1992) survey and the next available one (1999, Chapel
Hill). Unlike the practice followed by the CMP, however, I did
not use extrapolations with the exception of the 1981 election
in France for which I used the 1982 Castles and Mair (1984)
estimates. d) Because the Laver and Hunt (1992), Laver (1994)
and Laver (1998) surveys did not score parties on the L-R scale,
I used the average placement between the ‘increase services vs
cut taxes’ and ‘pro permissive social policy vs anti’ scales in-
stead, as done by Carter (2005, 143) citing communication with
Michael Laver. e) Ireland and Greece had two elections in 1982
and 1989 respectively, so I used the same estimates for both
elections. f) SYN contested the 1989 and 1990 elections in
Greece as an electoral coalition between KKE and the succes-
sor party of KKE-interior. For these two elections I used the
average placement between the two coalition partners as the
SYN estimate. g) Before estimation, all manifesto and expert
estimates were transposed to a common scale ranging from 0 to
1 using the well-known Value−MinMax−Min formula.
Table 3: Expert surveys used for the statistical comparison.
Survey Fieldwork Countries
Castles and Mair (1984) 1982 FR, IE
Laver and Hunt (1992) 1989 FR, GR, IE, CH
Laver (1994) 1992 IE
Huber and Inglehart (1995) 1993 FR, IE, CH
Laver (1998) 1997 IE
1999 Chapel Hill Expert Survey* 1999 FR, GR, IE
2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey* 2002 FR
Benoit and Laver (2006) 2003 GR, IE, CH
*See Hooghe et al. (2010) and Steenbergen and Marks (2007).
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